Abstract. This paper analyzes repeated multimarket contact with observation errors where two players operate in multiple markets simultaneously. Multimarket contact has received much attention in economics, management, and so on. Despite vast empirical studies that examine whether multimarket contact fosters cooperation or collusion, little is theoretically known as to how players behave in an equilibrium when each player receives a noisy and different observation or signal indicating other firms' actions (private monitoring). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to construct a strategy designed for multiple markets whose per-market equilibrium payoffs exceed one for a single market, in our setting. We first construct an entirely novel strategy whose behavior is specified by a non-linear function of the signal configurations. We then show that the per-market equilibrium payoff improves when the number of markets is sufficiently large.
Introduction
This paper analyzes repeated multimarket contact with observation errors where two players operate in multiple markets simultaneously. A firm, e.g., Uber, provides its taxi service in multiple distinct markets (areas) and determines its price or allocation in each area, facing an oligopolistic competition, which is often modeled as a prisoners' dilemma (PD). To improve profits, it is inevitably helpful to realize how the firm's rival should behave in an equilibrium. Alternatively, it is pointed out that tacit collusion among firms is likely to occur [7] . It is also desirable for a regulatory agency to theoretically understand the extent of the profits firms earn by collusion.
However, despite vast empirical studies [23] that have examined whether multimarket contact fosters cooperation or collusion, little is theoretically known as to how players behave in an equilibrium when each player receives a noisy observation or signal of other firms' actions. Without noisy observation, i.e., under perfect monitoring, where each player can observe his opponents' actions, there exists no strategy designed for multiple markets whose per-market equilibrium payoff exceeds one for a single market [3] . With noisy observation, one exception is a case where players do share common information, i.e., public monitoring where all players always observe a noisy, but common signal. A generalization of trigger strategies attains greater per-market equilibrium payoffs than the singlemarket equilibrium, assuming a public randomization device [14] .
In contrast, this paper considers a different, but realistic noisy situation where players do not share common information on each other's past history, i.e., private monitoring where each player may observe a different signal. For example, although a firm cannot directly observe its rival's action, e.g., prices, it can observe a noisy signal, e.g., its rival's sales amounts. Analytical studies on this class of games have not been very successful. Though the repeated PD with observation errors has been extensively studied, most papers assume public monitoring in the literature of economics [17] . This is because finding equilibria in such games has been considered to be extremely hard. Indeed, it requires very complicated statistical inferences to estimate the history a player reaches at a period and to compute the continuation payoff from the period on [13] . Notably, a belieffree approach has successfully established a general characterization where an equilibrium strategy is constructed so that a player's belief (about her opponent) does not matter [11, 10] . However, it is not obvious whether the belief-free approach is helpful in examining the effects of multimarket contact, because we want to deal with any number of markets. Its tractability may be lost if the number of markets increases, so that the number of available actions exponentially increases.
The goal of this paper is to answer the following question: under multimarket contact with private monitoring, can we find a particular class of strategies which can sustain a better outcome than an equilibrium strategy for a single market? For a benchmark, we focus on a strategy found by Ely and Välimäki [11] that attains the optimal payoff among belief-free equilibria in PD. Figure 1 illustrates the strategy, which we call EV, as a variant of the well-known tit-fortat strategy.
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To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to construct a strategy designed for multiple markets whose per-market equilibrium payoffs exceed one for a single market. First, we construct an entirely novel strategy whose behavior is specified by a nonlinear function of the signal configurations. Precisely, a player chooses her action at a period according to in which markets she receives bad signals at the previous period. We call this class of the strategies nonlinear transition, partial defection (NTPD). Then, we show that the per-market equilibrium payoff improves when the number of markets is sufficiently large via the theoretical and numerical analysis.
In the literature of computer science, AI, and multi-agent systems, there are many streams associated with repeated games [6] : the complexity of equilibrium computation [16, 5, 2] , multi-agent learning [4, 8, 19] , partially observable stochastic games (POSGs) [12, 9, 21, 18, 22] , and so on. Among them, POSGs is are the most relevant to repeated games with private monitoring because they can be considered as a special case of POSGs. However, POSGs often impose partial observability on an opponent's strategy (behavior rule) and not on opponent's past actions [18, 22] . They estimate an optimal (best reply) strategy against an unknown strategy (not always fixed) from perfectly observable actions (perfect monitoring). In contrast, we verify whether a given strategy profile is a mutual best reply after any history, i.e., finding an equilibrium, with partially observable actions (private monitoring). Thus, this paper also addresses understanding the gap between POSGs and repeated games with private monitoring in economics.
In fact, very few existing works have addressed verifying an equilibrium. Hansen, Bernstein, and Zilberstein [12] develop an algorithm that iteratively eliminates dominated strategies. However, just eliminating dominated strategies is not sufficient to find an equilibrium. Also, the algorithm is not applicable to an infinitely repeated game. Doshi and Gmytrasiewicz [9] investigate the computational complexity of achieving equilibria in interactive POMDPs.
Among an enormous number of studies on repeated games in economics, an important topic has been validity of the folk theorem. Most of them assume perfet or public monitoring (Please consult the textbook [17] ). In case of private monitoring, a recent paper [20] establishes a general folk theorem. However, the result is irrelevant to our analysis because the equilibrium strategies are excessively complicated and require nearly complete patience of the players. Specializing in multimarket contact, we rather show that the NTPD strategy forms a highly cooperative equilibrium and only requires the players to be mildly patient.
Model
Two players play M PDs simultaneously in each period. In each PD, each player chooses either C (cooperation) or D (defection). This is regarded as a model of oligopolistic competition, where C is an action increasing the total payoffs (for instance, in the case of price competition, charging a collusive high price), and D is a non-cooperative one (like a price cut). The players can choose different actions over the M PDs, so that each player's action set in each period is {C, D} M .
Each player cannot directly observe the other player's actions, but receives an imperfect signal about them. In each PD, each player receives either a good signal g or a bad signal b. We assume that each player receives his signals individually, and cannot observe the other player's signals (private monitoring). The pair of signals they privately receive in each PD is stochastic, following a common symmetric probability distribution that depends entirely on the action pair of that PD. We denote it by o(ω 1 , ω 2 |a 1 , a 2 ), where (ω 1 , ω 2 ) ∈ {g, b} 2 and (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ {C, D} 2 . We assume that the signals across the M PDs are independent, though the signals of a given PD may be correlated across the players. We also assume that the signal distributions are described by one parameter. There exists p ∈ (1/2, 1) such that for any i, any ω j (j = i) and any a ∈ {C, D} 2 ,
The marginal distribution of an individual signal in a given PD is such that the right signal (ω j = g if a i = C, and ω j = b if a i = D) is received with probability p. We let s = 1 − p, which is the probability of an error. The assumption is consistent with conditionally independent monitoring, which is a representative monitoring structure. Formally, a signal distribution is conditionally independent
In each PD, player i's payoff depends only on his action and the signal of that PD. The payoff function is common to all PDs, denoted by π i (a i , ω i ). We are more interested in the expected payoff function:
We assume that their expected payoff functions are represented by the following payoff matrix:
We assume x > 0, y > 0 and 1 > x − y, so that it indeed represents a PD. All M PDs are played infinitely, in periods t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Player i's private history at the beginning of period t ≥ 1 is an element of
i be an arbitrary singleton, and let H i = ∪ t≥0 H t i be the set of player i's all private histories. Player i's strategy of this repeated game is a mapping from H i to the set of all probability distributions over {C, D} M . That is, we allow randomized strategies. If the actual play of the repeated game is such that the action pair a m 1 (t), a m 2 (t) is played in the m-th PD in period t for each m and t, player i's normalized average payoff is
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is their common discount factor. The average payoff of any strategy pair is the expected value of Eq. 1, where the expectation is taken with respect to the players' randomizations and the monitoring structure. The standard solution concept for repeated games with imperfect monitoring is sequential equilibrium [15] , but here we focus on a special class called belief-free equilibria [10] .
Definition 1 (Belief-free equilibrium). A strategy pair is a belief-free equilibrium if for any t ≥ 0, h
, each player i's continuation strategy given h t i is optimal against player j's continuation strategy given h t j .
An important property of the belief-free equilibria is that, while player i given her private history should, in principle, optimize her continuation payoff against her belief about player j's history (and hence his continuation strategy), her continuation strategy is optimal even if she were to know j's history with certainty. 5 In other words, the players playing a belief-free equilibrium need not compute their beliefs in the course of play. When a strategy pair is represented by finite-state automaton strategies, as will be the case in subsequent analysis, it is a belief-free equilibrium if any player's continuation strategy (behavior expanded from the automaton) starting from any state is a best response (optimal) against the other player's continuation strategy starting from any state. Note that we never restrict the other's possible strategy space, which includes strategies with an infinite number of states.
Suppose both players employ a common strategy represented by a two-state automaton with state space {R, P }. Let V s1s2 , where s 1 ∈ {R, P } and s 2 ∈ {R, P }, be player 1's continuation payoff when (i) player 2 is currently at s 2 and then follows the automaton, and (ii) player 1 always plays the action prescribed at state s 1 at any subsequent history. The strategy pair is a belief-free equilibrium if and only if there exist V R and V P such that
and that V s2 (s 2 ∈ {R, P }) is player 1's best response payoff against player 2's continuation strategy when he is at state s 2 . To see this, note that by Eq. 2, player 1 at any history is indifferent between her continuation strategy at state R and that at state P irrespective of her belief about player 2's state. Since the second condition implies that both continuation strategies give her best response payoff at any history, the conditions for belief-free equilibrium are all satisfied. Let us explain the EV strategy [11] depicted in Figure 1 . A solid line denotes a deterministic transition and a dashed line denotes a probabilistic transition, though, for simplicity, we omit some state transition. EV is a representative twostate automaton strategy that forms a belief-free equilibrium under repeated games with private monitoring and attains the highest average payoff among belief-free equilibria in PD. It is parameterized by two numbers, ε R ∈ [0, 1] and ε P ∈ [0, 1]. A player first cooperates at state R, but after observing a bad signal, she punishes (defects) at the next period with probability R , or keep cooperation with 1 − R . Likewise, after she defects at P , if she observes a good signal, she returns cooperation with P , or keep defection with 1 − P . Proposition 1. There exist ε R ∈ [0, 1] and ε P ∈ [0, 1] such that the EV strategy pair is a belief-free equilibrium if
The average payoff starting from state R is What happens if there are M (≥ 2) PDs, in comparison with the case of one PD? If EV forms an equilibrium, it is always an equilibrium to play it in each PD independently. Obviously, the payoff of this equilibrium is M times the EV equilibrium payoff. Under this equilibrium, a player's actions in all PDs can be quite different, depending on the histories of individual PDs. Thus, the corresponding automaton has 2 M states. The transition probabilities from one state to another state depends linearly on the number of bad signals. We now ask how this feature of EV can be modified so that the equilibrium profit increases with two-state automaton strategies.
Nonlinear transition, partial defection strategy
The goal of the analysis of this section is to find a particular class of strategies which can sustain a better payoff outcome. The strategies in this class are representable by two-state automatons, and have the following two features: (i) the state transition probabilities are not linear in the number of bad signals, and (ii) defection in some PDs (partial defection) is prescribed at state P . Let us define the proposed class of strategies, which we call the nonlinear transition, partial defection (NTPD) strategy, given M PDs: Definition 2 (NTPD strategy). An NTPD strategy for M (≥ 2) PDs is a two-state automaton strategy, parameterized by an integer
-The state space is {R, P }, and R is the initial state.
-At state R, the player is prescribed to choose C in all PDs. At state P , she is prescribed to choose C in all PDs in A and D in all PDs in B. -Suppose the current state is R and k is an integer between 0 and M B = M − M A . Then 1. if b is observed among all PDs in A and there are k bad signals among the PDs in B, then the state shifts to P with probability 1 − (M B − k)ε (and stays at R with the remaining probability). 2. if g is observed among some PD in A and there are k bad signals among the PDs in B, then the state shifts to P with probability kε (and stays R with the remaining probability).
-Suppose the current state is P and k is an integer between 0 and M A . Then 1. if g is observed among all PDs in B and there are k bad signals among the PDs in A, then the state shifts to R with probability ε+ε (1−ε)M A − k (and stays P with the remaining probability). 2. if b is observed among some PD in B and there are k bad signals among the PDs in A, then the state shifts to R with probability (M A − k)ε (and stays P with the remaining probability). Figure 2 illustrates NTPD for two PDs in the same manner as Figure 1 .
In a similar way, the transition probabilities from P to R are specified. Their increase is constant for the number of bad signals from PDs in B. If she observes at least one bad signal from B, it is zero, otherwise, ε −εεM A . The transition probabilities decrease byε in the number of bad signals k in A. For k bad signals from A, the transition probability from P to R is specified as (M A − k)ε if she observes some b in B, or ε +ε{(1 − ε)M A − k} otherwise. We here mix 1 − kε with (M A − k)ε by the last parameter ε. 6 In fact, if she observes M A bad signals in A and M B good signals in B, she transits to R with probability ε −εεM A .
Two PDs
Let us first analyze the case of two PDs.
Theorem 1 (NTPD for two PDs). Fix M = 2 and M A = 1. There exist ε andε such that the NTPD strategy pair is a belief-free equilibrium if
The average payoff starting from R is
If the coefficient of δ in Eq. 5 is nonpositive, no δ satisfies it. Or if it does not hold at δ = 1, then no δ satisfies it. Furthermore, if x ≥ 1, Eq. 5 does not hold under any δ and p. Otherwise, it holds for all sufficiently large δ and p. A similar argument is applied to the case of M PDs.
Proof. Suppose M = 2 and Eq. 5 hold. Define Eq. 6,
From Eq. 5, we obtain
Hence the NTPD strategy with ε andε defined above, together with M A = 1, is well-defined. Some calculations verify that
Solving these, we obtain Eq. 2 for V R and V P defined above. These imply that (i) a player is indifferent between starting with state R and then conforming to NTPD and starting with state P and then conforming to NTPD, if the other player starts with either state R or P and then conforming to NTPD, (ii) a player's continuation payoff at one of the states when the other player is at
be a player's payoff when he selects D in the first PD and C in the second, and then conforms to NTPD when the other player's current state is s ∈ {R, P }. Similarly, let V DD s be a player's payoff when he selects D in both PDs, and then conforms to NTPD when the other player's current state is s ∈ {R, P }. The proof is complete if we show that V s ≥ max{V DC s , V DD s } for any s, i.e., each player at any state has no incentive to deviate from the action at that state. It is easy to verify that
From Eqs. 8 and 9, we obtain
Therefore, from Eqs. 8 and 12,
where the inequality follows from Eq. 7. From Eqs. 9 and 13, the same argument shows V R −V DD R ≥ 0. Therefore, from Eqs. 10, 14, and 16, we derive V P −V DC P = 0. As well, Eqs. 11, 15, and 16 imply V P − V DD P = 0. Corollary 1. Fix M = 2. For any δ, x, y, and p, if NTPD is an equilibrium, EV is an equilibrium and its payoff is greater than or equal to that of NTPD. This is straighforwardly derived from Theorem 1. The detailed proof is provided in Appendix A. Corollary 1 is somewhat negative. In fact, the NTPD's average payoff per market achieved in an equilibrium never exceeds that of EV. However, it is decreasing in the discount factor and is maximized with the lowest one so that the equilibrium condition is satisfied. With such a discount factor, if x ≥ y, NTPD performs the same average payoff as EV, though we omit the calculation due to space constraints. In the next subsection, we show that the consequence can be reversed when considering more PDs than two.
M PDs
The following theorem identifies the equilibrium conditions and the average payoff for the case of M PDs.
Theorem 2 (NTPD for M PDs).
There exist ε andε such that the NTPD strategy pair is a belief-free equilibrium if
hold. The average payoff starting from R is
where
Here, we refer to 1 − p as s for simplicity. Even though the proof is provided in Appendix B, it is basically the same as Theorem 1. Solving the system of value equations provides V R , V P , ε, andε. The conditions are derived from the incentive conditions and the feasibility conditions of ε andε. Note that, if p is sufficiently close to one, the equilibrium conditions are simplified to δ ≈ 1 and
The next corollary considers what happens if the numbers of PDs are sufficiently large.
Corollary 2. Fix x, y, and p. Suppose both M A and M B are sufficiently large and satisfy
Then if NTPD is an equilibrium for sufficiently large δ, EV is equilibrium, but its payoff is smaller than that of NTPD.
Proof. If NTPD is an equilibrium, Eqs. 17 and 18 hold. Hence, both of them evaluated at δ = 1 hold with strict inequality. If M A and M B are sufficiently large, we have s M A → 0 and s M B → 0. Therefore, the two strict inequalities imply
This and Eq. 20 imply that 2p − 1 − (1 − p)(x + y) > 0. It follows from Eq. 3 that EV is an equilibrium for sufficiently large δ. Furthermore, we show that the NTPD's average payoff is greater than the EV's one. From Eq. 19, the payoff of NTPD when we let s
The inequality follows from M > M B . Since the right-hand side is the average payoff of EV (M times Eq. 4), the proof is complete.
The result is positive unlike Corollary 1. If the numbers of PDs are sufficiently large, NTPD achieves a greater payoff than EV. A question remains: how many PDs are required so that NTPD still outperforms EV? As we remarked at the end of Section 3.1, if we use the lowest discount factor so that NTPD is an equilibrium, it always outperforms EV, irrespective of the numbers of PDs. However, it is hard to analytically investigate cases when players are mildly patient (δ < 1), because Corollary 2 cannot exactly be applied to the cases. Therefore, we provide a numerical analysis in Appendix C and show NTPD can yield better payoffs than EV for a specific number of PDs (M = 6).
Discussions
We have seen that NTPD sometimes outperforms EV. What aspects of NTPD contribute to such results? A key feature involves the nonlinearlity of the transtion probabilities. In fact that from state R to P does not depend on the outcome in A at all, as long as it contains at least one good signal. However, if all signals from A are bad, the transition probability sharply increases. In the former, that probability is kε where k is the number of bad signals in B. In the latter, it sharply increases to 1 − (M B − k)ε. This nonlinearity specifies the NTPD's first equilibrium condition in Eq. 17.
Why does this nonlinearity help? Suppose the other player is at state R, and consider how a player wants to play the PDs in A. Her incentive to play C or D in one PD in A crucially depends on the probability of the event that all signals among the other PDs in A are bad. Only under that event, is her action in this PD pivotal. Naturally, the event is more likely when she defects among more PDs in A. Therefore, her temptation to defect in one PD in A is largest when she cooperates among all other PDs in A. Note that we apply a similar argument to this when we check the incentives. This observation implies that once an NTPD strategy prevents a player from defecting in one PD in A, it automatically ensures that the player has no incentive to defect in any number of PDs in A. Therefore, as long as we consider the NTPD strategies, we can effectively ignore all actions which defect among two or more PDs in A. This reduction in the number of incentive constraints is a key to the payoff improvement results brought about by NTPD. Conversely, NTPD never outperforms EV with two PDs as in Corporally 1 because this reduction is ineffective for proving Theorem 1.
This argument also reveals that the NTPD strategies must involve partial defection. Due to the nonlinearity, it is suboptimal to defect in all PDs, including the ones in B. Since the actions at states R and P must be both optimal in a belief-free equilibrium, full defection cannot be the action at state P .
Alternatively, we suspect a more complicated strategy, i.e., automata with more than two states, not to improve the payoff. Adding a new cooperation state is ineffective for achieving an equilibrium, since it gives a player a chance to exploit her opponent. Because the new state increases the likelihood that a player cooperates, even if the opponent defects, she is unlikely to shift a punishment state. Thus, he at a cooperation state can deviate to defect without being punished. Conversely, adding a punishment state may lead to an equilibrium. However, such a strategy inevitably decreases the payoff. Also, the idea of NTPD can be extended for games beyond PD, e.g., a game where a player has actions more than three. We can construct some similar strategy if a game has an efficient outcome, e.g., every player cooperates, and a Nash outcome, e.g., every player defects.
Conclusions
This paper identifies equilibria in repeated multimarket contact with a noisy signal. For the first time, we find the multimarket contact effect in the proposed class of strategies, NTPD, particularly when the number of PDs is large. In future work, we would like to improve NTPD and to characterize an optimal equilibrium strategy class.
Appendices

A Proof of Corollary 1
Let us first show that the NTPD's equilibrium conditions imply that of EV. From the equilibrium conditions of EV and NTPD for M = 2 (Eqs. 3 and 5), we require
Then we obtain
When x ≥ y, Eq. 21 leads to x ≥ 0. This always holds from the definition of
This always holds because the lefthand side is always positive. Therefore, for any δ, x, y, and p, if NTPD is an equilibrium, EV is always an equilibrium. Second, we show that the EV's average payoff is always greater than or equal to that of NTPD when it is an equilibrium. From the average payoffs of EV and NTPD for M = 2 (Eqs. 4 and 6), we require
Next, we show that the equilibrium condition of NTPD for M = 2 (Eq. 5 in the paper) implies Eq. 22. This requires
Since we then obtain max{x, y} ≥ x, this clearly holds. The proof is complete.
B Proof of Theorem 2
We claim that the first condition for the theorem implies 0 <ε ≤ s
Therefore, V RR = V R . We also have the following value equations.
where Eq. 32 follows from the definition of ε. It follows from Eqs. 31 and 32 that
where the second equality is due to Eq. 28. This is equivalent to
From Eq. 32, we have
and substituting Eq. 33 proves V P P = V P . Comparing Eqs. 29 and 33, and using V P P = V RP , we obtain V P R = V RR = V R . It suffices to verify that (i) V R is a player's best response payoff when the other player is at state R, and (ii) V P is a player's best response payoff when the other player is at state P . To this end, let First, note that
This is linear in d B , and its slope is
where the equality follows from Eq. 29 and
where the last equality is due to Eq. 34. Since p > s, Eq. 23 implies
From these, we obtain
for any d A and any d B , as desired. Finally, note that 
where the second and third equalities follow from the definition of ε and Eq. 34, respectively. Since p > s, this is concave in d B . Further, it attains the same value at d B = 0 and d B = M B , and concavity therefore implies that
for any d A and any d B , the proof is complete.
C Numerical analysis
This section numerically evaluates NTPD. Throughout this section, we fix the stage game payoffs at x = y = 0.1 and assume a player in NTPD defects in the half number of the PDs at state P . 7 Figure 3 examines the average payoffs of NTPD and EV with six PDs (M = 6 and M B = M A = 3). The x-axis indicates the correctness of signals p while the y-axis indicates the average payoffs per PD. We plot the NTPD's payoffs with δ ∈ {0.7, 0.8, 0.9}. We show only the EV's payoff with δ = 0.7 because the payoff is independent of δ and, for lower δ, only the lower limit of p decreases.
EV is an equilibrium in the range of p ∈ [0.56, 0.99] and the payoffs increase as p does. EV is clearly an equilibrium in a wider range than NTPD for any discount factor: NTPD is an equilibrium when p ∈ [0.64, 0.83] for δ = 0.7, p ∈ [0.60, 0.88] for δ = 0.8, and p ∈ [0.58, 0.92] for δ = 0.9. Such an upper bound of p that NTPD is an equilibrium exists for a given δ because Eq. 17 requires δ to be high when p is high. A lower bound exists because Eq. 17 unlikely holds simply because the lefthand side is small and the righthand side is large when p is low. The NTPD's average payoffs are basically outperformed by the EV's one with δ = 0.9. However, as δ is lowered, the NTPD's payoffs gradually increase. When δ = 0.7, NTPD always outperforms EV with a maximum 4.75 % increase and a minimum 0.87 % increase. In addition, we confirm that a further low discount factor admittedly magnifies the difference as do larger numbers of PDs (M > 6) and that, if M > 6, there exists some parameter setting such that, if NTPD is an equilibrium, EV is an equilibrium and its payoff is greater than that of NTPD.
It must be emphasized that whether this improvement is subtle depends on how much a player actually values the payoffs. For example, if she is a president of a firm and the sales are a million dollars per month, a few percent increase definitely deserves her attention. This is also a reason why we assume that the gain from defection x and the loss caused by the opponent's defection y are small. In any case, besides the case of large M A and M B covered by Corollary 2, we could construct NTPD beating EV when the number of markets is relatively small.
The next question addresses whether NTPD achieves an optimal payoff among possible equilibrium strategies. We examine how efficient the NTPD's transition from state R. Under perfect or public monitoring, it is known that a player's equilibrium payoff vector can be computed independently from the opponent's one. Dynamic programming can derive the bounds of the equilibrium payoff of each player, i.e., a self-generation set [1] . It is guaranteed that an equilibrium strategy with a payoff vector in the set exists.
Under private monitoring, this is generally impossible. However, if an equilibrium is belief-free, since it satisfies an exchangeability property, the payoff set has a product structure [10] . Thus, given a continuation payoff starting from state P , the upper bound of one from state R is computed by the following linear programming: Note that i = j, if i = 1, j = 2, otherwise j = 1. The first constraints are incentive constraints: if a player obtains v i when she employs a strategy, deviating from the strategy is not profitable. f i (R) or f i (P ) indicates actions specified at state R or P . The decision variables are player j's mixed action α(a j ) and the product of the mixed action and i's continuation payoff that is dependent on j's current action and observation α(a j )z i (a j , ω j ). If i's action is specified at a state, the constraints must be defined with equality to satisfy belief-freeness. The next two specify the feasible bounds of the equilibrium payoffs. V P is given a priori, i.e., the NTPD's average payoff starting from state P . Thus, the solution implies maximizing the continuation payoff starting from state R. The last two define the feasibility for α(a j ). Figure 4 illustrates the NTPD's efficiency, i.e., the ratio of the NTPD's average payoff to the optimal payoff. The x-and y-axes indicate the ratio and signal correctness p, respectively. We fix the discount factor at δ = 0.8. When M = 2 or 4, the efficiency decreases once, increases in p, and reaches 0.99 and 0.98. When M = 6, it reaches 0.99, though NTPD is no longer an equilibrium when p exceeds 0.88. Observe that, when M = 6, NTPD performs at over 90% efficiency. There is a room for improving the NTPD's transitions from R. Whether we can further improve the transition is our immediate future work.
